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- an assessment for the case of Kyiv - 
 
Executive summary 
The present study discusses the question whether horizontal integration of 
different utility providers into one joint holding can be seen as a panacea for 
solving their substantial problems, or whether it even deteriorates their 
perspective for competition-oriented development in the future. Our 
conclusions are as follows: 
1. Merging e.g. suppliers of central heating, electricity, gas and water into 
one single holding will make it easier for the holding to reduce the scope 
for interfuel competition in e.g. heating and hot water, the only type of 
competition that so far prevails on Ukraine’s utility markets.  
2. Insufficient and inappropriate regulatory policy remains to be the main 
obstacle for development of competition. Against this background, merging 
the four monopolists bears the substantial risk of creating a strong, non-
transparent formation of vested and not necessarily competition-oriented 
interests, which might prove to be very difficult to overrule in the future 
when further advances towards competition are intended.  
3. At the same time, no significant economic gains are expected from such a 
merger. While problems of mutual indebtedness of the four utilities could 
be solved and payment discipline might be improved, the potential for 
significant efficiency gains is rather limited.  
Thus, joint Multi Utility holdings are unlikely to be a panacea for solving the 
substantial problems of utility provision in Ukraine. Instead, it limits the 
already low level of currently existing competition and makes it more difficult 
to advance towards more sophisticated modes of competition in the future. 
Finally, even if the merger allows realizing some moderate economic benefits, 
this only amounts to ease present problems of Kyiv’s utilities while the real 
cause underlying the poor performance – weak regulation – is not solved and 
might than be even more difficult to be solved in the future. 
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Introduction 
Recently, Kyiv City State Administration proposed to merge the public utilities 
Kyivenergo, Kyivgas, Kyivvodokanal and Kyivcitylight into one joint holding 
company. Initially, the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine (AMC) prohibited 
the merger of the two utilities, Kyivenergo and Kyivgas. Although this decision 
was overruled in court, the initiators refrained from the idea of merging only 
two companies and asked the AMC for the approval of the creation of a multi-
utility holding, which would consist of the four utilities mentioned above.  
According to Kyiv City State Administration, the merger will stabilize service 
provision, improve quality of services and raise production efficiency of the 
utilities. The plan also refers to positive international experience in the sector, 
however without further specification. In contrast, the AMC argues that 
without potential competitors and appropriate regulation the merger will 
increase monopoly power of the utilities, and thereby reduce incentives to cut 
costs of operation and to improve the quality of service.  
The present study assesses the economic outcomes of merging activities of 
utilities in Ukraine, with a particular focus on the pioneering case of Kyiv’s 
utility provider. Our starting point is the fact that competition in utility sectors 
is limited by strong entry barriers due to the typical reliance on infrastructure 
networks, which are costly to install and impossible to divide. Against this 
background, assessing the impact of a merger of four utilities – each 
operating as a monopolist on a respective market – on the level of 
competition development on each of those markets appears to be a needless 
task. However, since an ‘appropriate’ mixture of external regulation and 
incentive settings can still create an environment that simulates competitive 
pressure (with positive impacts on tariff levels and service quality), the 
current monopoly position of the four utilities should not be understood as 
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unavoidable. Accordingly, assessing the impact of the proposed merger on 
competition in the respective sectors is necessary. 
Our assessment provides answers to the following three questions: 
1. What forms of competition (or conditions fostering competition) are 
possible in the utility sector? 
2. What is the level of competition in the sector in Ukraine and in particular in 
Kyiv? 
3. Will the merger stimulate or limit the development towards more 
competition?  
1. What forms of competition are possible in utility sector? 
Even if a single or only a few players dominate a market, economists and 
policy makers around the world increasingly recognize that efficiency gains 
induced by competitive pressure can still be realized through ‘simulation’ of 
competition and creation of ‘conditions conducive to competition’. For the case 
of utility sectors, advantages from competition can be introduced through the 
following four modes, sorted by the increasing degree of competition:  
 Interfuel competition where consumers choose between different energy 
sources (e.g. power or gas) for the same purpose (e.g. heating or hot 
water). This type of competition is natural and stimulates efficiency 
improvements by power generating and supplying enterprises.  
 Incentive regulation of utilities, which provide stimuli for targeted 
activities. A regulator can use a ‘price cap’ approach and fix an upper 
bound for a utility’s price to motivate operators to reduce costs and 
improve efficiency in order to receive higher profit. In contrast the  
‘profit cap’ approach limits the maximum rate of return on assets 
providing a strong incentive for operators to invest (maintain and 
rehabilitate the system). Incentive regulation can incorporate a 
benchmark to evaluate the performance of the utility on the basis of the 
performance of the same utility over time, or through the use of an 
index or a control group of comparable utilities.  
 Public Private Partnership. Another way of simulating competition is to 
replace competition on a market by competition for a market. 
Therefore, the right of operating a utility service is offered to private 
companies through a competitive bidding procedure that selects the 
bidder who submits the most efficient offer (e.g. the lowest tariff at 
given quality level). Typically, the selected bidder will be given the right 
to operate the service jointly with public/municipal entities, while an 
appropriate type of incentive regulation guarantees high quality of 
services to consumers as well as profitability to the operators  
 Network/third party access is the permission for any company to use a 
distribution network for a non-discriminatory user fee in order to 
compete with other utility providers. In principle, this can be achieved 
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either by separating network and generation into different entities, or by 
regulating network access for third parties.  
A combination of those four means is in principle capable to create efficient 
results. But in contrast to a ‘regular’ competitive market with a large number 
of operators there is no self-enforcing mechanism, which guarantees the 
desired outcome (increasing efficiency of the operators performance). 
Consequently, stimulating competitive conditions through any of the four 
alternatives mentioned above requires public regulation that levels the 
interests of agents involved, in particular by ensuring high quality of services 
for consumers and sufficient cost coverage for suppliers while preventing price 
discrimination and monopoly rents.  
2. What is the level of competition in utility sector of Ukraine? 
2.1 Current level of competition 
In Ukraine the degree of competition on utility markets is rather low. 
Essentially, there is only some possibility for interfuel competition, e.g. 
through using autonomous boiler systems instead of the centrally provided 
heat and hot water, which is especially interesting for industrial customers 
such as service providers, construction firms etc.  
Centralized: 
 Kyivenergo (heating) 
Decentralized: 
Kyivvodokanal (water)+Kyivgas 
(gas) 
 Kyivgas (gas) 
 Kyivenergo (electricity) 
Centralized: 
 Kyivenergo (hot water) 
Decentralized: 
 Kyivvodokanal (water)+Kyivgas 
(gas) 
 Kyivvodokanal (water)+Kyivenergo 
Hot water 
 
 
Heating  
Water 
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Figure 1. Potential for interfuel competition 
 
 
Possible market structures Primary services Secondary services 
 
Interfuel competition on utility markets concentrates on provision of 
‘secondary’ services like hot water and heating. In general, the provision of 
these services can either be centralized (i.e. supplied by Kyivenergo) or 
decentralized as presented in Figure 1. Ideally, every consumer has heating 
and hot water metered separately and can thus freely choose the provider for 
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secondary services without having to pay for unused options. However, in 
Ukraine and in particular in Kyiv, the scope for such competition is technically 
and even administratively limited. First, there is no independent regulator who 
enforces installation of meters. Second, there is no clear legal basis to 
guarantee that the respective commissions, which approve and regulate 
installation and maintenance of boiler and heating systems, are free from 
political interference. On the contrary, members of such commissions are 
often employees of utility providing companies. While this is justified by the 
technical qualification of such experts, it clearly enables their companies to 
influence the decisions of such commissions.  
2.2 Factors limiting further development of competition  
The further stimulation of competition on utility markets is at the moment 
rather limited, mainly due to poor regulation. On the respective markets, 
the problems are as follows:  
 Electricity and gas: 
The National Electricity Regulatory Commission of Ukraine (NERC) has a 
mandate to regulate the power industry and the distribution of gas to 
final consumers. The NERC uses a cost-plus approach to tariff setting 
that ensures normative profits for operators, but fails to provide 
efficiency-stimulating incentives. As a result, regulated firms do little to 
improve their performance (e.g. through increased energy efficiency or 
reduction of losses), since any cost reduction achieved will translate into 
lower consumer tariffs. On the contrary, guaranteed cost coverage 
stimulates misuses by generating higher costs than necessary. 
 Heating, water supply and wastewater treatment:  
Tariffs for these services are not set by an independent regulator. 
Instead, this is done through negotiation between a local administration 
and the management of a utility. Such a procedure is not free from 
political interference and suffers from conflict of interests because the 
local administration is almost always simultaneously owner and tariff 
regulator of enterprises. Consequently, negotiations often result in 
inappropriate tariffs that do not cover costs of operation (for instance, 
on average tariffs of water supply cover only 65% of costs, heating 
tariffs cover 83%1). At the same time, there are no hard budget 
constraints on the utility company and losses are not compensated by 
public budgets.2 
The consequences of those insufficient schemes of regulation are generally 
the non-transparency of utility providers, often not even organized as 
corporatized public enterprises, and various types of cross subsidization, 
                                                 
1 The State Committee on Housing and Municipal Economy. 
2 Recently Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine returned for the repeated first reading the law that 
would enforce local administrations to compensate the losses of utilities from below-cost 
tariffs set by the administrations.  
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either politically motivated (from industry or public budgets to households) or 
simply as a result of combined and non-transparent operations (e.g. for power 
and heat generation).  
Furthermore, in the absence of clear regulatory responsibility and legal means 
of contract enforcement, many consumers of utility providers have refused to 
pay for consumed services, forming a vicious circle, as low payment discipline 
limits funds for investment, which worsens service quality, which even lowers 
payment discipline etc. This in turn causes a number of problems, which by 
now have also become additional impediments for a future introduction of 
competition on utility markets: 
 The rate of payment collection for all utility services is fairly low, e.g. 83% 
for the period from January to July 2003. Although the debt of Ukraine's 
population for the housing-communal services fell by 0.7% between July 
and August 2003, remaining debt still stands at UAH 7,42 bn.3 The problem 
arises mainly for a sector where cutting non-paying customers from supply 
is either problematic (power), or technically and politically impossible 
(water). 
 Mutual indebtedness between different utility providers has become a 
serious problem. For instance, power and heating providers drastically 
decreased their payment to gas providers for consumed natural gas from 
December 2002 to June 2003. By the end of 2001 the total debt for gas of 
public utility companies was UAH 760 m.4 Mutual indebtedness between 
water and energy supply enterprises also continues to increase. Since the 
cost of electricity is more than 30% of the total cost of water supply, water 
supply companies are the major debtors to electricity distribution 
companies while heating utilities (like Kyivenergo) are not eager to pay for 
water they use to the supplying companies (like Kyivvodokanal).  
 The state often grants privileges for numerous consumers without 
compensation from public budgets for it, which reduces the revenues of the 
utilities despite the legal obligations.  
 The current technical state of utilities’ assets is characterised with obsolete 
technology, deteriorated equipment and infrastructure with 
correspondingly low level of energy efficiency. The estimated costs of 
rehabilitation and renovation of the equipment and technology of Ukrainian 
network industries are estimated at around UAH 34,3 bn.5 For example, a 
                                                 
3 The State Statistics Committee. 
4 For example, total debts of Kyivenergo to “Gas of Ukraine” are UAH 96.8 m (UAH 46.2 m 
have been accumulated in 2003), in response to which “Gas of Ukraine” two times decreased 
the gas supply to the enterprise in October 2003. 
5 National program for reforms and development in the housing and municipal economy, 
registered 10.07.2003, No 4235. 
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complete overhauling is required for 25-40% of the assets of Ukraine’s 
water providers (first-level pumping equipment).6 
3. Will the merger stimulate or limit development towards more 
competition? 
We found the current level of competition in the utility sector to be rather low. 
Present weak regulation is a major barrier towards higher levels of 
competition. In fact, only two utility sectors have a public regulator (gas and 
electricity); others suffer from an absence of proper regulation. While 
assessing the impact of the proposed merger of the four utilities on 
competition we focus on two aspects, namely the impact of the merger on the 
current level of competition as well as on potential development towards more 
sophisticated types of competition. 
3.1 The impact of the merger on competition in the current situation 
In Kyiv, and in Ukraine in general, the only type of competition that so far 
prevails on utility markets is interfuel competition between providers of 
secondary services (heating and hot water). Naturally, merging the supply of 
gas, electricity, water and central heating into one single company will reduce 
the scope for such competition. In particular, while financial operations of 
different utility services can also be monitored through obligatory auditing, 
only an independent regulator can fully evaluate costs and quality of provided 
services and – if necessary – enforce relevant changes. Thus, even with 
mandatory auditing the possibility for cross-subsidization between different 
services cannot be ruled out in a decisive manner and given the current level 
of regulation on Ukraine’s utility markets, it is unlikely that a sufficient 
regulatory scheme can be established.  
Other factors possibly limiting the scope of interfuel competition are 
synchronized representation of the joint holding in relevant commissions and 
expert groups (e.g. those issuing licences and construction permits), and the 
control of utility companies over other services such as street advertisement. 
In Kyiv for example, Kyivcitylight provides light to advertisement installations 
while Kyivenergo and the city administration jointly set the rates for 
consumed power. Clearly, combining all utilities under a joint holding enables 
them to limit access to or to increase prices for using street advertisement for 
potential competitors. 
3.2 Limits to future development towards more competition  
As discussed above, insufficient regulation is the main obstacle for a further 
enhancement of the competition status in utility sectors in Ukraine, and 
definitely also in Kyiv. Thus, regulatory reform will be crucial for the 
successful introduction of new modes of competition. At the moment there is 
no single regulatory authority in place with a mandate to regulate all activities 
of such a utility holding. So substantial conflicts of interest between central 
                                                 
6 ‘Development of Domestic Markets in Ukraine. Welfare through Competition’, IERPC, Kyiv, 
May 2003 (http://www.ier.kiev.ua/English/books/dev_of_dom_eng.pdf) 
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and local authorities, the management of utilities and investors about the 
distribution of privileges, rents and obligations are likely to occur, just as it 
happened in other countries where utility markets and services have been 
gradually liberalized (e.g. in Germany or France). Against this background, 
merging Kyivgas, Kyivenergo, Kyivvodokanal and Kyiv city light, all 
monopolists on their respective markets, bears the substantial risk of creating 
a strong formation of vested and not necessarily competition-oriented 
interests, which might prove very difficult to overrule in the future when 
further advances towards competition are intended. 
4. Economic effects of the merger 
Further development of competition between utilities is hampered not only by 
weak regulatory schemes, but also by concrete operational problems such as 
deteriorated equipment and low payment discipline. Naturally, the initiators of 
the merger might argue that merging Kyiv’s utilities might even be conducive 
to competition because it will lead to significant improvements of the current 
situation. Therefore, approval or disapproval of the merger should also 
depend on the answer to this question. In this section, we briefly discuss the 
expected economic effects of the proposed formation of a multi-utility holding. 
4.1 Payment enforcement   
Merging the four utilities could of course help solving problems of mutual 
indebtedness between the four companies. Furthermore, it might contribute 
to improved payment enforcement as a multi-utility holding typically has 
greater leverage to lower its payment risk. For example, for the case of Kyiv 
this could be possible to ensure payment of water bills by a threat of 
withholding other services that are easier to disconnect.  
4.2 Efficiency gains 
Among the most ponderable argument in favour of a joint utility are efficiency 
gains. However, in Kyiv as well as in Ukraine in general, economies of scale 
and scope, which lead to the reduction of costs and improvement of efficiency, 
are unlikely to play an important role for the development of the utility sector 
in the nearest future. This is based on the following reasons: 
 The first question is how significant efficiency gains can be. A reduction 
of administrative costs – the typical result of synergy effects from 
merging companies – will not significantly cut total costs since they are 
simply not the main cost driver7. Rather, maintenance/replacement of 
outdated equipment account for the major part of total costs. 
 Second, efficiency gains will not automatically be realized by merging 
the four utilities. Rather, substantial efforts toward the integration of the 
companies have to de made to achieve those gains. Accordingly, also 
                                                 
7 Administrative costs account only for small parts in total expenses. For Kyivenergo, for 
example, the share of administrative costs in total costs is less than two percent. (Statements 
of financial results of Kyivenergo, 2002). 
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international experience is rather mixed. During the last 15 years or so, 
multi utility strategies driven by mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in 
various local markets were developed by private companies such as EDF 
and Suez (France), or RWE and E.ON (Germany) in order to increase 
market share and operational efficiency. In response, local authorities 
formed city-specific multi utility holdings in order to also increase 
efficiency. But, the assessment of both strategies is mixed. The M&A 
strategy of private companies has proven to be rather risky and can 
only be evaluated on the firm level. For public Multi Utilities, 
experiences have been rather negative as higher efficiency levels have 
proven to be very difficult to achieve. As a result, several Multi Utility 
holdings have even been unbundled back to their initial organizational 
structure. For example, in Germany’s capital Berlin the previously 
existing multi-utility was split into different providers of water, gas and 
electricity after the joint holding failed to realize any improvements in 
efficiency.8 
 Third, even when some moderate cost reduction through lower 
administrative costs and joint marketing could be realized, there is no 
guarantee that it will be forwarded to consumers (through lower tariffs 
and/or higher service quality) or used for investment/ replacement, as 
the appropriate regulation with proper incentives is lacking at the 
moment. Instead, in the absence of appropriate regulation the new 
institutional organization would allow for various forms of 
mismanagement and cross-subsidisation of services.  
 Finally, substantial cost reduction in the long run can only be achieved 
by improving energy efficiency and renovation and rehabilitation of 
equipment, which needs investments.  
Thus, the scope of efficiency gains does not appear to be very significant.  
4.3 Investments 
The possibility of attracting external investments, which is said to be a further 
advantage of the merger, appears to be questionable as well. One reason is 
that the holding activities would be asymmetrically regulated (in case 
regulatory environment does not change) and cross subsidization might occur. 
So typically, attracting investments would require the unbundling rather than 
the integration of activities in order to provide the highest possible degree of 
transparency. Furthermore, for the case of utilities, attracting private funds to 
ensure a sustainable service quality at sufficiently low prices requires 
introduction of well-designed regulation. 
4.4 Management capacity 
In general higher management level and better performance of one or 
another utility may not justify an administrative decision to give other utilities 
                                                 
8 For more on international experience see IER Analysis A2/2003. 
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under the management of the more efficient provider in order to improve the 
financial and technical state of poorly operated public enterprises. The 
management capacities should rather be improved through hiring of 
respective human capital. According to representatives of Kyivenergo, one of 
the promoters of the merger in the City of Kyiv, their management has much 
more superior capacity and a broader experience in overcoming problems of 
utility providers. Thus, they are well suited for reanimating other utilities, 
which face similar problems.  
This is might be true or not, but it can of course not be understood as the 
reason for changing the corporate and organizational structure of Kyiv’s 
market for utility services. Rather, such superior skills can be transferred 
through personal changes in the management.  
5. Our assessment 
Competition in network industries like utility provision is not a natural 
outcome of market activities. Utility services rely on access to networks, 
which creates substantial entry barriers. Nevertheless, the current 
monopolistic structure of such markets in Ukraine is not a natural 
consequence. Rather, an appropriate mix of external regulation and incentive 
settings can form a market environment conducive to competition, where 
efficiency gains from competitive pressure can still be realised.  
Currently the public utilities sector of Ukraine, and Kyiv in particular, is in a 
neglected state and characterized by insufficient regulation and legal 
protection. As a consequence, utility providers suffer from low payment 
discipline; mutual indebtedness of enterprises while non-transparent 
performance substantially reduces the interest of private investors. Against 
this background, the Kyiv city state administration as the owner of the four 
large utility providers intends to improve the situation by merging them within 
a single holding.  
In the present study we have discussed the impact of such a merger on 
competition. Based on this assessment we conclude the following: 
1. Merging e.g. suppliers of central heating, electricity, gas and water into 
one single holding will make it easier for the holding to reduce the scope 
for interfuel competition in e.g. heating and hot water, the only type of 
competition that so far prevails on Kyiv’s utility markets. 
2. Insufficient and inappropriate regulatory policy remains to be the main 
obstacle for development of competition. Against this background, 
merging the four monopolists bears the substantial risk of creating a 
strong, non-transparent formation of vested and not necessarily 
competition-oriented interests, which might prove to be very difficult to 
overrule in the future when further advances towards competition are 
intended.  
3. At the same time, no significant economic gains are expected from such 
a merger. While problems of mutual indebtedness of the four utilities 
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could be solved and payment discipline might be improved, the potential 
for significant efficiency gains is rather limited.  
Thus, we recommend to AMC not to approve the merger since it not 
only limits the already low level of currently existing interfuel 
competition, but it will also makes it even more difficult to advance 
towards more sophisticated modes of competition in the future. 
Finally, even if the merger allows realizing some moderate economic 
benefits, this only amounts to ease present problems of Kyiv’s utilities 
while the real cause underlying the poor performance – weak 
regulation – is not solved and might than be even more difficult to be 
solved in the future. 
A.C., F.P. Lektor: L.Ha.      Kyiv, December 2003 
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